We present a model of endogenous growth in which government consumption and production services are financed by distorting capital taxes. We generalize Barro's public finance model of growth in two ways. First, we study the properties, and the role in growth, of a wider menu of second-best optimal policies, namely, the capital tax rate and the portion of total tax revenues used to finance public production services versus public consumption services. Second, we investigate the possibility of the existence and uniqueness of a long-run equilibrium in which optimal policies do not change and the economy grows at a constant balanced growth path, as well as the possibility of dynamic determinacy of this long-run equilibrium.
INTRODUCTION
General equilibrium models of long-term (i.e., endogenous) growth have studied the role of fiscal policy in the growth process 1 . The main idea [see Barro (1990) ] is that government expenditures can work as a positive externality in the private production function. Then, at the aggregate level, there are no diminishing returns and the economy is capable of long-term growth.
If government expenditures are financed by distorting taxes, this raises several questions regarding the optimal level of government expenditures and the associated optimal tax rate. For instance, does an optimal tax rate exist? If it does, is it unique? Is it optimal for policymakers to keep the tax rate constant over time and equal to the productivity of government expenditures, as in Barro (1990) ? 2 Is the resulting long-term growth path (known as a balanced growth path) unique and dynamically stable?
The present paper continues the study of optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy. Our goal is to study analytically the dynamics of second-best optimal policies and endogenous growth, when the government uses capital taxes to finance both public consumption services (which provide direct utility to households) and public production services (which provide positive externalities to private firms). 3 In particular, we make two contributions to the literature. First, we study the properties, and the role in growth, of a wider menu of jointly chosen policies, namely, the capital tax rate and the portion of total tax revenues used to finance public production services versus public consumption services. Second, we investigate the possibility of existence and uniqueness of a long-run equilibrium in which optimal policies do not change and the economy grows at a constant positive rate, as well as the possibility of a unique transition path to this long-run equilibrium. We believe that our modelling approach can be used by a large class of growth models with optimal fiscal policy.
We assume that the government is benevolent and acts as a Stackelberg leader visa-vis private agents 4 . Then, three features of second-best optimal policy are of particular interest. First, the two jointly chosen policy instruments (e.g., the capital tax rate and the portion of total tax revenues used to finance public production services) are substitutes along the optimal path. Intuitively, when the government allocates a larger share of tax revenues to public production services, it can afford a lower tax rate because public production services stimulate private investment and hence increase the tax base. Second, the government finds it optimal to accomplish its allocation task by not following state-contingent policy rules. That is, the optimal tax that allows the finance of public services and the optimal allocation of the collected tax revenues to the various types of public services are both independent of the state of the economy (here, the inherited capital stock). Such a policy introduces fewer distortions. Third, since the government also provides public consumption services, the optimal tax rate is all the time higher than the productivity of public services (which is the standard Barro tax rate). As a result, the policy that maximizes the utility of the representative household implies that the optimal tax rate (respectively, the optimal share of tax revenues used to finance public production services) is higher (respectively lower) than the one that would maximize the rate of growth.
We also investigate the possibility of uniqueness of equilibria. We establish the existence of a unique long-run equilibrium in which consumption and capital grow at the same constant balanced growth path (BGP). Local stability analysis shows that the economy jumps immediately in a unique way to this long-run equilibrium. A unique path implies local determinacy. 5 Jumping immediately to the long-run equilibrium implies that the optimal policies are constant over time, and hence there are no transitional (i.e., gradual) growth dynamics. Thus, the dynamics are similar to those of an Ak model. Therefore, one of the most popular policy recipes-that it is optimal to keep tax rates constant over time [see Barro (1979 Barro ( , 1990 ]-carries over to an economy with both production and consumption public services and in which policymakers have a wider menu of policy instruments at their disposal. 6 The result that it is optimal to keep the policy instruments constant over time, and independent of the state of the economy, is a form of tax smoothing. Intuitively, when policy instruments are distortive, the fiscal authorities should allocate their policies over time to avoid additional intertemporal distortions. This is the most efficient form of policy. 7 The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the competitive equilibrium. Section 3 solves for second-best policies. Section 4 closes the paper.
THE ECONOMY AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
We set up a decentralized closed economy with a private sector and a government sector. The private sector consists of a representative household and a representative firm, who both act competitively. The representative household consumes, rents out its assets to the firm, and supplies inelastically one unit of labor services.
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The representative firm produces output. The government taxes the firm's installed capital to provide public services. This section solves for a decentralized competitive equilibrium, given economic policy. We assume continuous time, infinite horizons, and perfect foresight.
Representative Household
The representative household maximizes intertemporal utility,
where c is private consumption, h is public consumption services and the parameter ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference. The function u(c, h) is increasing and concave in its two arguments, and also satisfies the Inada conditions. For simplicity, we assume that the instantaneous utility function is additively separable and logarithmic. 9 Thus,
where the parameter ν ≥ 0 is the weight given to public consumption services relative to private consumption.
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The household saves in the form of capital. Thus, if k is the beginning-ofperiod capital stock, the interest income is rk, where r is the return to capital. The household also supplies inelastically one unit of labor services per unit of time so that its labor income is w . Further, it receives profits, π , from the firm. Then, the budget constraint is c +k = rk + w + π,
where a dot over a variable denotes a time derivative and the initial capital stock is given. The household acts competitively by taking prices, policy instruments, and public goods as given. The control variables are c and k, so that the first-order conditions for optimality are equation (3) 
The necessary conditions (3) and (4) where u c ≡ ∂u(c, h)/∂c. 11 As it is known, there exists a unique solution to this problem [see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) ].
Representative Firm
As in and , the government taxes the representative firm's capital stock, k, carried over from the previous period. Then, if 0 < θ < 1 is the tax rate on installed capital, (1 − θ)k is the net capital stock used in production in the current period. Also, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 153) , technology takes a Cobb-Douglas form so that the firm faces the production function (written in intensive form),
where y is output, g is public production services and 0 < α < 1 is a parameter. The profit for the representative firm is
The firm acts competitively by taking prices, policy instruments, and public goods as given. This is a well-defined problem. The control variable is k so that the first-order condition is
which equates the rate of return to the after-tax marginal product of capital.
Government Budget Constraint
At each point of time, the government runs a balanced budget financed by capital taxes, θ k. 12 Thus,
where
where 0 < b < 1 is the share of total tax revenues used for public production services and 0 < (1 − b) < 1 is the share used for public consumption services. Here, b will be chosen optimally, jointly with θ [see, e.g., Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) and Devarajan et al. (1996) for an exogenous decomposition of government expenditures between consumption and production services].
Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (Given Policy)
We now characterize a decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) for any feasible economic policy. In particular, we choose to express the DCE in terms of the tax rate, θ , and the share of tax revenues used for public production services, b. Note that the choice of θ and b completely characterizes economic policy because, as (8a)- (8c) show, only two of the four policy instruments (g, h, θ, b) can be independently set. By substituting (8b) into (7), we get
which is the return to capital perceived by private agents (i.e., households and firms) in a DCE. This is the return that drives private consumption/saving decisions in a decentralized equilibrium. In the presence of externalities, this return is lower than the realized one (see below). This justifies government intervention. To get the private agents' optimal decision rules in a DCE, we also need to calculate realized labor income and profits, w + π. Using (8b) into (5), the econ-
where k is the capital stock that has been chosen by private agents who ignored externalities. 13 We also know that realized capital payments, labor income, and profits exhaust total output. That is, y = Rk + w + π, where R denotes the realized return to capital. However, the above expression for economywide output gives
which in turn implies w + π = y − Rk = 0. 14 In other words, in a DCE, and since the model is a version of the Ak model, all realized income goes to capital.
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Using w + π = 0 and (9) in (3) and (4), the private agents' optimal decision rules for savings and consumption in a DCE are, respectively,
where (9) . We summarize this section. We have solved for a decentralized competitive equilibrium. This is for any feasible economic policy. The latter is fully described by the tax rate, θ, and the share of tax revenues used for public production services, b. In this equilibrium, (i) private decisions maximize households' utilities and firms' profits [this is summarized by equations (10) and (11)]; (ii) the government budget constraint is satisfied [this is summarized by equations (8b) and (8c)]; and (iii) all markets clear. The next section endogenizes the choice of θ and b.
OPTIMAL (SECOND-BEST) ECONOMIC POLICY
We now endogenize economic policy, θ and b. To do so, we follow the relevant literature by assuming that the government is benevolent and plays Stackelberg vis-a-vis the private sector. 16 That is, the government maximizes the utility of the representative household by taking into account the DCE. We assume commitment technologies on behalf of the government, so that decisions are made once and for all.
Therefore, the government chooses the paths of θ, b, c, and k to maximize (1)-(2) subject to (10), (11) , and (8c).
17 The current-value Hamiltonian, H , of this second-best problem is (12) where γ and λ are the multipliers associated with (10) and (11), respectively.
The necessary conditions with respect to θ, b, c, λ, k, γ are given by (13a), (13b), (13c), (13d), (13e), (13f), respectively:
we therefore have (1 − α − θ) < 0 along the optimal path. These necessary conditions are completed with the addition of the transversality condition,
which ensures that utility is bounded. 18 Condition (13g) says that the long-run growth rate of consumption, [ (θ, b) − ρ], is less than the discount rate, ρ > 0.
Properties of Optimal (Second-Best) Economic Policy
Notice four things in the solution above. The first one is technical. Since the utility function and the constraints are continuous and bounded, and since the utility function is strictly concave in the controls (c, θ, b) and the constraints are linear in c and strictly concave in θ and b, existence is ensured [note that θθ (.) < 0 and bb (.) < 0]. Further, since the utility function and the constraints are both jointly concave in the controls (c, θ, b) and the state variable (k), the government's problem is well defined and the necessary conditions, (13a)-(13g), are also sufficient for optimality. This establishes the existence of a solution for optimal policy.
Second, equations (13a) and (13b) imply that, in each time period,
so that the two policy instruments, θ and b, move in opposite directions in each time period. Intuitively, when the government allocates a larger share of tax revenues to public production services (i.e., b increases), it can afford a lower tax rate (i.e., θ decreases) because public production services stimulate private investment and hence increase the tax base. That is, θ and b are substitutes along the optimal path. Third, consider the special case in which public consumption services provide no utility; that is, ν = 0 in (2). Then, (13a) implies (1 − α − θ) = 0; that is, θ = 1 − α in each time period.
19 This is the popular tax rate of, for example, Barro (1990) and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) . In other words, when ν = 0, the optimal tax rate is constant over time and equals the productivity of public services, (1 − α). Also note that when ν = 0, (13b) implies b = 1 in all time periods; that is, when public consumption services offer no utility, it is natural to use all tax revenues to finance public production services. In turn, a constant θ and a constant b imply a constant capital return, (θ, b). Then, (13d) and (13f) show that the economy has no transitional growth dynamics. Therefore, when ν = 0, the necessary conditions for optimality imply that the economy adjusts immediately to its steady-state, balanced growth path (see also below).
Fourth, as we argued above, in the general case in which public consumption services provide utility (i.e., ν > 0), we have 1 − α < θ < 1 along the optimal path. That is, since the government also provides public consumption services, the optimal tax rate is higher than (1 − α). This gives θ (θ, b) < 0. Thus, the policy that maximizes the utility of the representative household implies that the optimal tax rate is higher than the one that would maximize the rate of growth. Only when ν = 0, θ (θ, b) = 0 so that the optimal tax rate also maximizes the rate of growth. This is similar to Barro (1990) . Also, recall that b (θ, b) > 0. Thus, the optimal share of tax revenues used to finance public production services is lower than the one that would maximize the rate of growth.
Transforming the Model
Now, let us go back to the algebra. Equations (13a)-(13f) constitute a dynamic system of six equations in six variables (θ, b, c, λ, k, γ ) . Following usual practice, we reduce the dimensionality of the system to facilitate tractability. Taking logarithms on both sides of equations (13a) and (13b), differentiating with respect to time, and using the other first-order conditions (13c)-(13f), we get, after some algebra,
Next, by defining z ≡ c/k to be the consumption-to-capital ratio, we obtain from equations (13d) and (13f)
Therefore, the original six-dimensional system (13a)-(13f) in (θ, b, c, λ, k, γ ) has been reduced to the three-dimensional system (15a)-(15c) in (θ, b, z) only. The dynamics of the latter are equivalent to the dynamics of the former. Observe that the system is dichotomized. Namely, the dynamic equations (15a) and (15b) constitute a block in the two policy instruments (θ, b) only. This means that the government finds it optimal to accomplish its allocation task by not following state-contingent policy rules. 20 That is, the optimal tax that allows the finance of public goods (θ ) and the optimal allocation of the collected tax revenues to the various public goods (b) are independent of the state of the economy (here, the inherited capital stock).
21 Obviously, such a policy introduces fewer distortions.
Steady-State Balanced Growth Path
A BGP is defined as a steady state in which (i) consumption, c, and capital, k, grow at a common positive constant rate. This implies z ≡ c/k is a constant, orż = 0 in equation (15c). (ii) The policy instruments do not change. Thus,θ =ḃ = 0 in equations (15a) and (15b).
This subsection solves forz,θ , andb (tildes above variables denote the corresponding long-run values).
We start withz. Setting equation (15c) equal to zero, we simply havẽ
so that the long-run consumption-to-capital ratio equals the discount factor, ρ > 0. We continue withθ andb. Equations (15a) and (15b) imply that, forθ =ḃ = 0 to hold, we must have (θ, b) = 0. Then, the values ofθ andb will follow from (θ, b) = 0 and the atemporal relation (14), which links these two policy instruments in each time period. In other words, we have the following two-equation system inθ andb:
Although (16b) and (16c) cannot be solved analytically forθ andb, we show in the Appendix the proof of Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1. If the parameter values satisfy condition (13g)
, there exists a unique optimal long-run tax rateθ (where 0 < 1 − α <θ < 1), and a unique optimal long-run allocation of tax revenues between public production and public consumption servicesb (where 0 <b < 1). In turn, this policy supports a unique balanced growth path along which long-term consumption and capital grow at the same positive constant rate.
Dynamic Stability
We will now study the determinacy of equilibria and the local stability properties around the BGP. Linearizing (15a)-(15c) around the unique BGP in (16a)-(16c) implies that the dynamics are approximated by the following linear system:
where the Jacobian matrix is evaluated on the BGP (hence the tildes). Recall that A, B, , and E have been defined in (15a)-(15b). It also easily follows that
The trace-determinant combination of the Jacobian matrix implies that there are three real eigenvalues whose values are 0, ρ > 0, and
Now, observe two things. First, there is a zero eigenvalue. This implies that the matrix in (17) is singular. In our case, a singular Jacobian of the endogenous variables means that the dimensionality of the system is not three but only two. This is not surprising. It happens because the two policy instruments, θ and b, are proportional to each other in each time period [see (14), above]. Thus, the endogenous dynamics of θ are also the dynamics of b (and vice versa). Second, and given the first point, there are two positive (i.e., unstable) eigenvalues. Since there are also two non-predetermined (i.e., jump) variables, z ≡ c/k and θ (or b), the BGP is stable. What does it mean? As is well known, when there are both predetermined and jump variables, we have to impose terminal conditions that eliminate the impact of unstable eigenvalues (i.e., remove bubbles), so that the saddle-path solution for all variables is determined by the stable eigenvalues and the values of the predetermined variables at some initial time. It is the presence of predetermined variables that implies transitional (i.e., gradual) endogenous dynamics as the economy converges to its steady state along the saddle path. That is, determinacy means that jump variables jump in a unique way to place the economy on its unique saddle path.
In our model, all three variables (z, θ, b) are jump variables. Without predetermined variables, all transitional endogenous dynamics disappear and the saddle path solution is equivalent to the steady state. That is, now determinacy means that the jump variables jump immediately in a unique way to take their long-run values and stay there (until the system is disturbed in some way). Any solution other than the long-run solution, (z,θ,b) , generates a trajectory that monotonically diverges from (z,θ,b) .
In turn, with (z, θ, b) equal to their long-run values (z,θ,b) for all t, this implies that c/k =z = ρ for all t. That is, given the initial capital stock, the choice of consumption keeps the consumption-to-capital ratio constant over time. Also, with (θ,b) being always equal to its long-run value, the growth rate of consumption and capital are also constant over time. 22 That is, the dynamics of the model are as in the Ak model. There are no transitional dynamics and the economy is always in steady-state equilibrium. This is the only trajectory that satisfies all of the equilibrium conditions including dynamic stability.
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The above results are summarized by Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2. Under Proposition 1, the economy adjusts immediately to its steady state and there are no transitional dynamics.
These results generalize Barro (1990) . The policy recipe to keep the tax rate constant over time carries over to an economy with both production and consumption public services and in which policymakers choose not only the tax rate but also the allocation of tax revenues between the two types of public services. Note, however, that in contrast to Barro (1990) where the property that the policy instrument is constant over time follows directly from the necessary conditions for optimality [see (13a) above], in our more general model, this property is dictated by the requirement that the system be dynamically stable. 24 As is known, the unstable paths that satisfy the necessary conditions but contain bubbles are not really optimal. Also note that the recipe for keeping the policy instruments constant over time is a tax-smoothing result. Since policy instruments are distorting, the fiscal authorities find it optimal to allocate policies over time to minimize their intertemporal distortive effects.
Finally, note that our result that the BGP is determinate is consistent with the result of Benhabib and Perli (1994) , who state that externalities (however large) are not enough to produce multiple equilibrium trajectories. It is also consistent with the suggestion of Benhabib and Gali (1995) that, in one-sector growth models, uniqueness of the equilibrium trajectory is preserved, as long as the steady state is unique. Technically speaking, the uniqueness condition for a BGP in Proposition 1 ensures the determinacy of equilibria in Proposition 2. This also verifies Lucas' (1988) conjecture that all equilibrium paths converge to a BGP. That is, countries with the same initial conditions converge to the same long-run growth rate, although not to the same long-run level of capital stock and GDP.
25 Therefore, the growth convergence property extends to growth models with Barro-type public services [Basu and Weil (1998) show a similar convergence property in an Ak model].
CONCLUSIONS
This paper extended the Barro-type public finance model of endogenous growth to study the role of second-best optimal tax policy, public consumption services, and public production services in the growth process. We characterized the long-run equilibrium and the dynamics of optimal policies and endogenous growth.
We close the paper with two possible extensions. First, it is interesting to see how robust the determinacy result is by adding more structure, for example, endogenous labor decisions, and cross-effects between private and public consumption or between private consumption and labor decisions. Second, we can study a multicountry version of our model so as to examine international interactions when fiscal policies in one country create externalities in other countries. We leave these extensions for future work. NOTES 1. For growth and the public sector, see, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) and Agell et al. (1997) . For empirical evidence, see, for example, Devarajan et al. (1996) and Kneller et al. (1999 Kneller et al. ( ). (1995 point out, this is because in the Ak model, "capital encompasses human capital, knowledge and public infrastructure," while "the zero wage rate can be thought as applying to raw labor which has not been augmented by human capital."
16. An alternative way of endogenizing policy is to suppose that private agents vote on fiscal policy. 17. Thus, the government is constrained by the private agents' optimal decision rules. This is because the economy is decentralized. In other words, we do not solve the social planner's problem. See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 4) .
18. Capital cannot grow faster than consumption (see below). Hence, the utility from government consumption services is also bounded if (13g) is satisfied.
19. In particular, when ν = 0, (13a) implies either (λc + γ k) = 0, or θ = 0, or θ = 0. The first possibility, (λc + γ k) = 0, cannot occur because this contradicts the dynamic equations (13c)-(13f). The second possibility, θ = 0, cannot occur either, because a zero tax rate implies a zero capital return [see equation (9)]. Only the last possibility, θ (θ, b) = 0, can occur. However, since
we have (1 − α − θ) = 0. 20. Here, this is the only policy task. That is, we do not have stabilization or distribution tasks. 21. also get a non-state-contingent optimal tax rate when they use a CES production function.
22. This follows from (13d) and (13f), which implyċ = c [ (θ,b) 
23. On the other hand, do get transitional dynamics when they generalize the production function to a CES form. The same happens in Futagami et al. (1993) when they introduce public capital.
24. Thus, this result can follow only after we carry out the stability analysis. 25. Hence, this is not the usual turnpike property, in the sense that convergence occurs at a rate rather than at a level. Convergence results for the latter are surveyed by McKenzie (1987) .
APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Consider equations (16b) and (16c) in the text, which are two equations inθ andb. Recall that 0 < 1 − α < θ < 1 and 0 < b < 1 along the whole optimal path.
Total differentiation of (16b) implies 
